The People's Korea

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Hamhung Plenary Meeting Sets Task of Attaining 1.5 Mil. Tons of Non-Ferrous Metals by 1988

A plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee was held for the first time on the spot, set a high target to attain the goal of 1.5 million tons of non-ferrous metals by 1988 and elected Choe Yong Rim and So Yung Sok members of the Politburo and Chon Byong Ho and Kim Du Nam its alternate members.

The August 29-31 Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Sixth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea held in Hamhung put up a slogan "All Efforts for the Attainment of the Goal of 1.5 Million Tons of Non-ferrous Metals", and put forward tasks to hit the goal of one million tons of non-ferrous metals within 2-3 years and the goal of 1.5 million tons of non-ferrous metals by 1988.

The targets, the plenary meeting said, "should be attained with the general mobilization of the whole Party, the whole country and the entire people."

The historic Hamhung Plenary Meeting which was presided over President Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, also put forth tasks to bring about a new turn in the development of the machine-building industry by realizing the overall introduction of press and stamp-forging methods and effecting a revolution in welding and insulated material production.

It said that the overall introduction of press and stamp-forging methods should be completed in the overall production of machines within 2-3 years through a vigorous drive to realize it.

The Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Sixth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea is a historic plenary meeting, the first in the DPRK to be held on the spot on the initiative of the DPRK top leader.

The Hamhung Plenary Meeting was a historic meeting which showed the leadership of the Party in drawing up the line and policies in conformity with the specific conditions and actual realities of the country, finding proper ways for their implementation.

It was attended by members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee.

It was also attended by members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, and members and alternate members, of the WPK Central Committee and members of the Central Auditing Commission of the Party.

Leading personnel of central and local party, administrative and economic organs and Party secretaries and directors of major industrial establishments were present at the 3-day plenary meeting as observers.

The following three items were put on the agenda of the plenary meeting:

1. On attaining the goal of 1.5 million tons of non-ferrous metals;
2. On realizing the overall introduction of press and stamp-forging methods and effecting a revolution in welding and insulated material production in the field of the machine-building industry;
3. Organizational Problem.

The meeting heard a report "On Attaining the Goal of 1.5 Million Tons of Non-ferrous Metals", delivered by Kang Song San, Member of the Political Bureau and vice-Premier.

He pointed out that an energetic drive to attain the high target of one million tons in a short time and go on to hit the target of 1.5 million tons in the production of non-ferrous metals is a very important and honorable grand battle of construction for attaining the vast long-term objectives of socialist economic construction put forth at the Sixth Party Congress held in October 1980.

"If the goal of 1.5 million tons of non-ferrous metals is attained with a new turn in their production, it would be possible to strengthen economic cooperation and exchange with many countries of the world, further develop foreign trade and successfully solve many problems arising in attaining the high targets of socialist economic construction," stressed the reporter.

The reporter added that when this goal is attained, the DPRK will hold the first place in the world in the per capita non-ferrous metals output and the independent socialist economy will grow in strength to be an economy of greater potential and vitality.

The plenary meeting set forth production targets of lead, zinc, copper and various other non-ferrous metals to be attained by 1985 and by 1988 and put forward concrete tasks to hit the targets.

The meeting also heard a report on the second agenda item delivered by Hyon Mu Gwang, Alternate Member of the Political Bureau, and Secretary, of the WPK Central Committee.

General Secretary Kim Il Sung made important concluding speeches on the first and second items, respectively.

The Hamhung Plenary Meeting elected Choe Yong Rim and So Yung Sok, who had been alternate members of the Politburo, members of the Political Bureau and elected Chon Byong Ho and Kim Du Nam its alternate members.

"What are they looking at?"
From this issue, we will carry photos taken by People's Korea's photographer Pak Kil Hun, photos taken by him when he visited the DPRK this summer. —Editor

Kang Song San Appointed as First Vice-Premier

President Kim Il Sung on August 31 promulgated a decree of the Central People's Committee of the DPRK on appointing Kang Song San as First vice-Premier of the Administration Council of the DPRK.
—KCNA

Pyongyang on Gen. Chon's African, Canadian Tour

Rodong Sinmun, organ of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, in recent commentaries, dealt with Chon Du Hwan's visit to African countries and Canada.

In the first comment on the matter, Pyongyang's foremost paper said that Chon's visit to these countries was arranged in accordance with the script written by the United States.

Follow excerpts from commentaries:

On African Tour

Chon Du Hwan, the dirty lackey of U.S. and heinous traitor to the nation, recently toured such African countries as Kenya, Nigeria, Gabon and Senegal.

Chon Du Hwan's tour of Africa was made at a time when the U.S. colonial rule over south Korea and the Chon junta's policy of dependence upon its master were ever more vehemently denounced and rejected at home and abroad.

Under such situation Chon Du Hwan pursued through his recent tour the aim of veiling his treacherous nature as a colonial puppet and fascist murderer to deceive and flout public opinion at home and abroad and boost his prestige which has fallen to the ground and of whitewashing south Korea to make it appear to be an "independent state" to curry favour with the African countries and deliver himself from ever more serious international isolation.

His junket, therefore, was arranged in accordance with the aggressive demand of the U.S. for keeping hold on south Korea forever as its colony and military base; It was an out-and-out tricky trip produced on the script written by his U.S. masters.

This was clearly proved by utterances made by traitor Chon Du Hwan while touring African countries.

In all places he visited, he shamelessly clamoured about being "steadfast in upholding the idea of anti-colonialism."

The U.S.'s colonial rule over south Korea is the most typical survival of colonialism still remaining in our world.

It is entirely unbecoming and outrageous for the dirty colonial stooge of the U.S. to talk about "anti-colonialism."

If Chon Du Hwan has even one ten thousandth of the "idea of anti-colonialism," not to say one per cent, he should have, before anything else, denounced U.S., the bulwark of modern colonialism, and opposed its colonial rule over south Korea. But, being the lowest grade stooge of U.S., he dared not utter a word condemning his masters' colonialism.

To all intents and purposes, the jargon of Chon Du Hwan was nothing but a trick to veil the miserable reality of south Korea today and cover up his anti-popular crime in having caused such situation.
(Aug. 29)

(Continued on page 8)

Koreans in Canada Stage Anti-Chon Demonstration

Korean residents in Canada August 29 staged a demonstration in Ottawa to oppose Chon Du Hwan's trip to Canada.

When Chon Du Hwan was visiting the residence of the south Korean ambassador to Canada for a party, Korean nationals in Canada, together with conscientious Canadians held a demonstration outside the residence.

The demonstrators denounced Chon Du Hwan's Canadian trip, carrying placards condemning his crimes against the country and the nation.

Earlier the same day, when Chon Du Hwan arrived at the Ottawa Air Force Base, a group of about 30 protesters demonstrated outside the military base's gate, carrying placards reading "we're against military rule" and "we demand release of political prisoners."

Meanwhile, New Korea Times, a Korean-language paper published in Canada, in a recent issue, carried statements by the Society for the Study of Democracy and National Unification in Canada and the Toronto Society for Promotion of Commemoration of the Righteous Kwangju Uprising.

A statement published by the latter lodged a strong protest with the Canadian Government for accepting Chon's request to visit that country and said, "We denounce the brazen-faced act of Chon Du Hwan in visiting Canada styling himself as a 'president' elected in a democratic way, while feigning ignorance of his thrice-cursed crimes and keeping many guiltless people in prison."

Building of Socialist Economy and Its Development (16)

Modernization of Agriculture

(Continued from the previous issue)

Study and Spread of Agricultural Technology in 1945–1960

In the colonial period, agricultural techniques were backward and no advanced techniques were widely adopted. Some projects for agricultural development, including the land reform and seed improvements, were partially carried out. Many rice polishing factories were also built. However, these developments were partial and brought nothing good to the masses of peasants. They were carried out just to increase the production of rice which was the main agricultural product supplied to the suzerian state (Japan). Agricultural techniques were developed so that the demands of the colonial bureaucracy and landlords might be met to ensure their colonial plunder.

In those days, most peasants cultivated land with bare hands, while a few of them used old and backward farm implements, including hoes. However, rice polishing factories which were more developed than those in Japan in those days, were built in many places where peasants brought rice they cultivated, including ports, beginning with Inchon, Pusan and Kunsan of the southern part of Korea.

However, workers at the agricultural experiment stations of the Government-General, who were in charge of developing agricultural techniques, numbered only 73 throughout Korea (19 engineers, 47 assistant engineers and 7 secretaries, excepting other employees), while officials at the grain examining stations who examined rice sent to Japan, numbered 886 or 12 times that of workers at the agricultural experiment stations (110 engineers, 845 assistant engineers and 31 secretaries, excepting other employees). The main work of the agricultural experiment stations was to find fountainheads in the rice of Korea. Of the total 73 officials, 20 worked at branch offices. They did not include even a single Korean.

It was in such a condition that the Korean people had to start a technical revolution after the liberation.

Following the democratic reform which began just after the liberation, the Korean scientists and engineers held a meeting on October 18, 1946, where the immediate tasks for the development of sciences and technology were spelled out. The meeting attached special importance to the following: As a result of the democratic reforms, foundations for building an independent national economy and for raising people's living standard were established, the devastated economy should be reconstructed; and the remnants of colonial backwardness should be completely eliminated.

Scientists and engineers were required to play an important role in reconstructing the national economy, overcoming colonial backwardness, so that a prosperous and independent development of the country might be guaranteed.

Their immediate tasks were: First—to obtain full information on the realities of the national economy, including the conditions of raw materials, facilities and equipment, resources, finance and labor, in order to work out a plan for reconstruction and for the development of factories and enterprises; second—to educate and train new engineers and specialists, in order to solve the shortage of engineers; and third—to study advanced ideology and to be politically trained, as they had to accomplish these tasks in a complicated situation.

Grain and Maize Output

	Grain	Maize
1946	1,890,000 t	156,000 t
1949	2,654,000	375,000
1953	2,327,000	224,000
1956	2,873,000	760,000
1960	3,800,000	950,000

Source: Korea Yearbook, 1958, Pyongyang

The Korean scientists and engineers first made preparations to set up study organizations to train new engineers.

The agricultural experiment stations in Sariwon, Pyongyang, Chonju, Hamhung and Pochon which had been provincial committees of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee, came to be placed under the direct control of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee in March 1946. Under unified leadership, experimental studies started. Later in 1947, the Central Agricultural Experiment Station under the direct control of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee, was established in Sariwon, as the central guiding organization of other agricultural experiment stations. The central station consisted of the departments of rice cultivation, non-paddy field cultivation, gardening, agricultural chemistry, agricultural physics, pathology and harmful insects. Local agricultural experimental stations increased in number (Chongju, Kangye, Pochon, Sindok, Kyongsong, Hamhung, Pyongyang and Haeju).

In September 1946, an agricultural department was established in Kim Il Sung University, and was later developed into an agricultural college in 1947. Many students and other people concerned were sent to the Soviet Union and East European countries to learn agriculture.

These systems developed so that people could learn, and use and spread new agricultural sciences and technology.

It was in the course of this movement that the Korean War started. During the war or in 1952, a meeting of scietists was held in the Pyongyang underground theater from April 27 to 30. The meeting defined the principles and methods which had to be maintained and followed in the reconstruction and development of the national economy, according to the policy line of establishing an independent national economy. The task of developing sciences and techniques were clarified. The main agricultural task was to solve the problem of food shortage.

Main tasks of scientists and engineers were:

To study natural conditions; to increase arable land; to recultivate farmland which once had been suspended from cultivation; to reclaim 300,000 hectares of tideland on the West Coast which accounted for 15 percent of the country's total arable land; to select plants which could grow well even on salty soil; to promote other studies relating to increasing per-hectare crop output, including pedology, seed improvement; to promote breed improvement for the development of livestock breeding; to study cattle breeding methods sanitarily in a good feed condition; and to guarantee feed production bases.

In the course of attaining these tasks, research systems were gradually expanded. Scientists who had attached importance to solving the urgent problem of food shortage at first, came to tackle many other agricultural problems gradually.

The five big successes achieved were as follows.

First: Protection, utilization and development of land.

Eighty percent of Korea's total land was mountainous and the rains fall in July and August accounted for 50–60 percent of the total annual precipitation. Land was devastated because of the two wars. With these problems, scientists and engineers faced the tasks of preventing loss of water from inclined arable land, construction of facilities for erosion control, growing trees for protection against erosion, constructing embankments, river dams and irrigation systems, and protecting and improving arable land. They also studied how to utilize reclaimed land, tableland and hills.

Second: Breed improvement and management of feed cultivation.

Stress was laid on widely introducing intensive cultivation. For this purpose, studies were promoted on plant improvement and many successes were achieved—production of pure breeds, pure and pure breeds, growing plants resistant to typhoons, double crop plants, plants that can be harvested together with others, plants for cold and hot areas, rice seeds for direct sowing, plants suitable for reclaimed land, industrial plants, oil plants, vegetables and others.

Great progress was made in the studies on cultivation methods, as a result of surveys of local weather and land conditions, right crop for right and right crop for right season, multiple cultivation, mixed planting of crops, improvements in the system of fertilizer application, rice seedlings in cold nurseries and planting of small stumps of rice seedlings.

Third: Livestock breeding and sericulture.

These were particularly backward in the colonial days. However, foundations for their new development were laid in this period. Breed improvement of Korean cows, pigs and sheep was promoted, the improvement of the quality of cattle through a system of production and application of pure breeds was made.

Studies were also successfully made on animal feed problems, protein yeast production, concentrated breeding, modernization of breeding, quick breeding of livestock, improved veterinary and sanitation work, prevention of animal epidemics and improvement of breeds of silkworms.

Fourth: Irrigation, mechanization, electrification and chemicalization.

Priority was given to irrigation. (Refer to the previous issue of the PK on irrigation work just after the liberation.) After the realization of socialist cooperativization of agriculture or in 1959, the irrigation projects covering 370,000 hectares of land were completed in only half a year.

In order to guarantee smooth construction of irrigation systems, studies were made to fully utilize already constructed irrigation systems, to repair reservoirs, improve water management, prevent wasteful water utilization, and to reuse drainage, increase irrigated land, scientifically manage water, according to physiological demand of plants, nature of soil and weather conditions, and to lessen per-hectare water consumption and to do drainage work on damp fields.

The completion of the work of irrigating all the paddy fields was followed by the expansion of irrigation systems for non-paddy fields. This brought a great increase in per-tan crop from non-paddy fields.

Mechanization started just after the liberation. In 1947, a tractor plowed a state-run farm for the first time. Tractor stations were experimentally started operations in main plain areas in 1948, including Chaeryong county in Hwanghae Province. A full-scale mechanization started in 1960 or after the socialist cooperativization of agriculture, together with the work for strengthening the economic foundations of cooperative associations. It was November 1958 that Korea's first tractor "Chollima" was produced.

Studies for mechanization were promoted in consideration of land conditions—farmland consisted of small plots of land which differed in area; in some districts farmland was on slopes; in other districts, stony; and in lower areas a larger part of farmland was wet.

Farming conditions had to be considered not only in plowing but also in planting, weeding and reaping conditions were diverse; different crops were grown in different areas; and some farms grew different crops on the same fields.

Above studies were promoted together with a study of scientific technology, including machine engineering, pedology, plant biology and crop cultivation.

The fifth and the biggest success in this period was that maize-producing areas were largely expanded, and a per-tan maize output greatly rose. This was the decisive factor for increased grain production in the country.

Since non-paddy fields accounted for two-third of the country's total arable land, the key to increased grain production was to increase maize output whose per-tan yield was over the paddy high level. Until the end of the Korean War, main maize production bases were North and South Pyongan provinces and Chagang Province. Other localities mainly produced millets which were easily affected by long rains and cold weather. So, the grain output in these areas was very low.

Aiming at increasing grain output, the Government began a movement to increase maize output, upholding the slogan, "Maize is the king of non-paddy fields." As a result, the total area devoted to maize increased from 241,000 hectares in 1953 to 784,000 hectares in 1960, or 3.3 times that of 1953, with the percentages of maize fields in the total non-paddy rising from 10.5 percent to 28.3 percent in the period.

Particularly North and South Hwanghae provinces largely increased their maize fields. Those in South Hwanghae Province increased from 1.1 percent of the total non-paddy fields in 1953, to 13.9 percent in 1960, and North Hwanghae Province from 9.1 percent to 15.6 percent.

These developments in maize output increased the country's total grain production and laid foundations for the development of livestock breeding, as the expanded maize fields could produce enough feed for livestock breeding.

Together with the expansion of maize fields, plant improvement and new cultivation methods contributed to this increase in maize output. Scientists found over 30 pure seeds from already shown maize seeds. They did hybridization experiments twice in greenhouses and once in outdoor fields a year. They succeeded in developing the country's first mixed breed "Soksong No. 1" and the high-yielding breed in 1972.

The method of maize planting with nutrition pots on fields before planting, and the method of concentrated planting were also introduced.

The per-tan maize output rose to 500kg in 1974 from 90kg in 1946, 93kg in 1953 and 121kg in 1960.

(To be continued)

Peasants are happy, pouring water over themselves in the waterway of a newly constructed irrigation system. (At a farm in Chongryong county, South Hamgyong Province, 1959)

1923 Great Kanto Earthquake

This Tragedy Must not Repeat Itself: More Than 6,000 Koreans Massacred

It is 59 years now since a great earthquake hit Japan's Kanto district, including Tokyo and Yokohama on Japan's east coast, on Sep. 1, 1923.

At that time, the Japanese authorities massacred more than 6,000 Korean residents in Japan, setting a false rumor afloat that "Koreans caused a disturbance," and mobilizing the Japanese army, police and vigilante corps.

Now, in revising history textbooks, the Japanese authorities minimize the number of Koreans killed by the Japanese in the wake of the Kanto Great Earthquake and try to distort the historical fact and justify it.

But conscientious Japanese have been carried on fact-finding activities and have held memorial services for the Korean victims since over 20 years ago.

Group Starts Exhuming Koreans' Bodies in Tokyo

On Sep. 1, a group of Japanese began exhuming the ashes of Koreans massacred by Japanese during the frenzied aftermath of the Kanto Great Earthquake, on the basis of evidence that in the midst of the panic directly after the Kanto Great Earthquake, Koreans were massacred on the riverbed of the Arakawa bank in Tokyo and that hundreds of the bodies were buried there.

This exhuming work was carried out by the preparatory committee for a society for exhuming Koreans' bodies massacred at the time of the Kanto Great Earthquake, and for holding memorial services for that.

"The main purpose of this project is to appease the souls of the massacred Koreans and to launch a drive to pledge not to repeat the same mistake," said Kinuta Yukie, a 51-year-primary school teacher who heads the project.

The place selected for exhuming the bodies is on the riverbed of the Arakawa bank in Sumida Ward, Tokyo, about 100 meters downstream from the Kinegawa Bridge.

At 1 p.m. on Sep. 1, the memorial service was held at the exhuming site, with about 250 persons attending, including students of the 5th Tokyo Korean primary-junior high school near the site.

"On the day following the earthquake, Koreans were taken to the bank of the Arakawa River, 10 at a time, and were mowed down with a machine gun, their hands tied behind their backs," a witness said.

"After the soldiers left the bodies of the Koreans as they were, I had to dig a hole, cremate the bodies and bury them together with members of a youth group.

We buried were 70 or 80 Koreans there. There were men, women and children. At that time, the Japanese authorities were spreading false rumors that groups of Koreans were setting fire to houses, and that Koreans had thrown poison into wells. I feel sorry for them," said one of the witnesses, a 77-year-old scaffolding man.

Drawn swords pointed to Koreans taken to a police station.

Note:

1923 Great Kanto Earthquake

At 11:58 a.m. on Sep. 1, 1923, a large-scale quake which registered a magnitude of 7.9 on the Richter scale hit the Kanto district of Japan, which caused big fires in Tokyo and Yokohama and destruction in all parts of the Kanto districts.

After the earthquake, big fires started, causing great damage and confusion among the people.

At that time, the Japanese ruling classes were afraid of anti-government mass movements of the Japanese people.

At the same time they were afraid of rising anti-Japanese national struggles among Koreans in Japan influenced by the March First Popular Uprising in 1919 (in Korea).

As soon as the earthquake occurred, the Japanese authorities proclaimed "martial law," forming a fascist-militarist Cabinet and ordering it to kill Koreans.

The Japanese authorities deliberately spread false rumors against Koreans in order to divert the attention of the Japanese people.

The Funabashi naval communications center in Chiba Prefecture spread a lie that Koreans were setting fire to houses and that they were throwing poison into wells and were arising in a riot.

A large number of armed troops were mobilized – tens of thousands of army and navy troops, including the "Imperial Guard" Division and the first division and police.

The areas where Koreans were victimized included Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama, Tochigi, Gunma prefectures and other Kanto areas.

As press activities were virtually suspended by the earthquake disaster, the false rumor that Koreans have started a riot, spread by the Funabashi naval communications center, spread among the Japanese already thrown into confusion.

Koreans were massacred cruelly – their heads sawn off alive, their eyeballs were gouged out with Japanese swords, their ears and noses were cut off; and pregnant women were stabbed with sharpened bamboo sticks in their bellies.

In Chiba Prefecture, the army is known to have ordered a vigilante corps to massacre the arrested Koreans.

It is said that 6,000 to 7,000 Koreans were massacred. But the truth is not yet fully known, as the Japanese authorities have neglected to investigate the incident fully.

Eyewitness Account

Here is a story told by a 81-year-old Korean compatriot, Cho In Sung, who lives in Shinagawa, Tokyo. This is the story that he experienced at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake.

Mr. Cho In Sung

I was born in 1901 at Kochang, South Kyongsang Province.

My parents were tenant peasants.

I came to Shimonoseki, Japan on Feb. 1923, leaving my native place, where I could live no longer under the Japanese rule.

Then I came to Oshiage, Tokyo via Osaka to find a livelihood. Since then I had been working a wage worker with two Korean compatriots.

Then, an unforgettable thing occurred. At 11:58 a.m., on Sep. 1, all of a sudden, the earth began to shake.

Houses were destroyed as they crashed. I run for my life. About half past twelve fires broke out.

Fire broke out in many houses because it was lunch time.

There was a casting factory near there but it was in a melting-pot. The whole sky was dyed deep red.

At about one o'clock, that day I reached the Arakawa bank making a narrow escape.

Fortunately I met the two Korean compatriots with whom I was living.

At around 8.30 a.m., I heard someone shouting "Where are Koreans?" and "You are a Korean, aren't you?" and heard babies crying on the embankment.

About half past nine, gun reports echoed around noisily. Japanese began to shoot Korean compatriots indiscriminately.

I heard bullets being shot into the river water.

I escaped with the two Koreans in an opposite direction of the embankment.

At about 10:00 p.m., nine Koreans called on us. After a while four members of a Japanese fire-brigade pounced on us.

They left 12 Koreans, including me, bound tightly with thick and strong rope and went running somewhere else, saying menacingly, "You must not move even a step from this place. If you leave this place, I will kill you."

We passed a nightmarish night without sleep, with our hands and feet bound.

At about 4 o'clock, at dawn, the Japanese fire-brigade members came with three more Koreans who were bound with rope. They were going to take us to the Terajima Police Station.

After all, we 15 Koreans were taken there.

On our way to the police station, I could not but doubt my eyes.

When we were about to cross a bridge, we found mountain-high heeps of dead bodies on the bridge and on the riverbed.

There was hardly any space to set foot on.

The Japanese there were heaping of Koreans' bodies, hauling them with fireman's axes, cursing and swearing "Damn Koreans!" or "Dirty Koreans."

Near the middle of the bridge, I found my cousin's body.

I held his body in my arms, weeping "Ah! my cousin!" and "My cousin, What is all this?"

The cousin's bloodstained body was miserable beyond description.

One of the fire-brigade members came running, and knocked me and jerked my left leg with a fireman's axe, shouting, "God damn you! I'll kill you."

He bound my hands with a policeman's rope again.

I barely rose to my feet and began to walk again on the bridge which had been changed into a pool of blood and spread over with the bodies of my Korean compatriots.

But next time, 4 members of the fire-brigade jumped upon three of us and began to attack them violently with their firemen's axes, as soon as we reached the foot of the bridge.

Their necks and hands were cut off and intestines were ripped open.

(Oh, now I am finished. Why must our compatriots die in vain in this way?)

When I thought so, blood seemed to drain from my heart.

(Continued on Page 6)

Fully armed troops massacred Koreans everywhere.



Koreans were killed, bound to stakes.

U.S. House Report on Tripartite Military Integration

"The total value of war reserve stockpiles in Korea (the south by the U.S.) now approximates $2 billion . . . Japanese defense industries are recently attracting wider attention. . . ," says a report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives by a staff study mission which traveled to Japan and south Korea from July 23 to August 15, 1981.

The report made public on May 25 this year, touched upon overall the U.S. Far Eastern strategy, focusing on the present status of defense cooperation with Japan and south Korea.

The following are excerpts from the report entitled "United States Relations with Japan and Korea: Security Issues":

U.S. Military Presence in Northeast Asia

By far the greatest concentration of U.S. Armed Forces in Asia is located in Northeast Asia in Japan and Korea. These forces include 1-3/2 divisions of ground forces (two-thirds of a Marine division on Okinawa and an Army division near the demilitarized zone in Korea), modern air force units equipped in F-15, F-16, A-10, and F-4 aircraft, and naval forces including such major vessels as the aircraft carried *Midway*, which is homeported in Yokosuka, Japan. U.S. Armed Forces in Japan total about 45,000, about two-thirds of which are on Okinawa; the United States has about 36,000 ground and air forces in Korea. Besides these combatant units, significant quantities of logistics supply are stored in the region; and major U.S. naval and aircraft overhaul and maintenance facilities are present. Truly, the United States has a military capability and presence in Northeast Asia second only to U.S. deployments in NATO.

Despite difficulties, military cooperation between the United States and Japan and Korea continues to improve. – In general, in both Korea and Japan, there now exists greater joint planning and coordination than has existed before. The extensiveness of such joint efforts does vary, however, and United States-Japan undertakings are considerably more modest than those with Korea. The Combined Forces Command in Korea is a totally integrated command under U.S. military leadership. Under such a condition, it would seem inevitable that U.S. forces would be immediately and extensively involved in hostilities should a major outbreak occur in Korea. By contrast, in Japan, the United States and Japanese forces are engaged in far more basic joint efforts.

United States and Japanese forces have also recently undertaken the first modern joint exercises. Japanese participation was given very high marks by their U.S. armed services counterparts.

Korean Defense Production And Arms Export

The committee has been aware of and has already indicated concern about transfers by the Republic of Korea of defense items supplied by the United States or produced under U.S. license. This concern was indicated during a hearing of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs during the spring of 1981, and was reiterated in the committee report and conference report on the foreign assistance legislation. The total value of war reserve stockpile in Korea now approximates $2 billion.

Japanese Defense Production And Arms Export

Japanese defense industries are recently attracting wider attention as a result of emphasis on force modernization in Japan aided and abetted by U.S. pressure on Japan to increase its defense capacity.

Congress and the committee have faced several issues in this regard. Legislation has been passed that would essentially give Japan treatment in arms export practice similar to that afforded NATO. Thus, certain costs can be waived, report requirements excepted to stimulate greater cooperation with the Japanese defense improvement efforts and greater standardization of military equipment between the United States and Japan. The fact that Japan has proved successful in coproducing sophisticated defense equipment under U.S. license has even given rise to concern among certain Members of Congress that Japan might begin competing with U.S. companies for export markets.

The Japanese have experienced many problems as they purchased U.S. defense equipment in past years. They report delivery delays, which complicate planning and increase costs. The Japanese goal of self-sufficiency in defense production may originate from larger national strategic objectives, but doubts about the reliability of the United States as a supplier seem to have provided a boost for this objective. Japan also wants to be self-sufficient in defense industry because it will make supply and maintenance and other support activity easier.

Japanese businessmen would like to keep manpower costs down and increase procurement which is now a smaller percentage of the defense budget. We were told that certain Japanese corporations involved in defense production would welcome additional hardware contracts and have the physical and personnel capacity to significantly increase defense production.

Several factors combined serve to prevent arms export by Japan. A Japanese Government policy in principle prohibits arms exports, permitting export of defense-related items only under carefully defined circumstances.

Despite Government policy and the disincives articulated by the Japanese, we were told of indications of increased attention to export possibilities. Two prospects should be kept in mind: (1) Japan can produce equipment for which there would be anticipated demand. A current example, a small, lightweight tank was mentioned as the type of item for which there could be demand in low-income countries in Southeast Asia. Although U.S. officials have not seen much interest shown by Southeast Asian countries, whose traditional suppliers are the United States and Western Europe, genuine interest by foreign buyers in purchasing Japanese defense equipment could be hard to resist. (2) The military-industrial connection has been made in Japan and retired military officers join industrial firms and travel abroad to represent them. The fine line between purely civilian technology and military technology may more easily be crossed in the face of such activity.

Some U.S. officials did indicate that such items as fiber optics, electronic components, and radar inhibitive paint, could be among the types of technology useful to the United States. Japanese reluctance to export arms was cited as one reason Japan might officially argue against exporting military usable systems even to the United States. This argument did not impress us as all that serious. For example, we were particularly struck with how able Japanese contractors were in transferring defense systems to the U.S. Navy as Japanese maintain and repair the sophisticated systems of the *Midway* aircraft at Yokosuka Naval Base. Such maintenance and repair work does in fact amount to Japanese exports of defense equipment and such technology transfer is allowable under the security treaty and the defense assistance agreement with Japan despite Japan's overall ban on military exports.

Japan's International Role And Defense Policies; Defense Expenditures

Congressional concern for Japanese defense policies has focused on Japanese defense spending expressed in a variety of ways in 1981. Particular attention, at least by the Japanese media and Government, was given to House and Senate resolutions such as the Neal resolution and Zablocki-Levin resolution (H. Con. Res. 213 and S. Con. Res. 46) and to Senator Helms proposed amendment (later withdrawn) to the foreign aid bill. These measures all aimed to encourage Japan to make a greater financial contribution to defense. The Neal resolution urged that, in lieu of direct expenditures for its own military establishment, Japan enact a security tax at 2 percent of GNP that would be transferred to the United States in compensation for U.S. military protection of Japan. Senator Helms' motion would have encouraged renegotiation of the treaty with the aim that Japan would do more. The Zablocki-Levin resolution would have Japan spend at least 1 percent of its GNP for defense.

During our visit to Japan, we were given a very helpful explanation of the Japanese defense budget process at the Ministry of Finance. Officials explained that the Japanese budget cycle begins in the early spring with a presentation by the Ministry of Finance to the full Cabinet of an estimate of expected tax revenues for the next fiscal year. At that time, the Ministry of Finance advises the various ministries of the percentage increase they can expect over the previous year. Subsequently, in late June or July, the Cabinet decides on budget ceilings for the various ministries. After budget ceilings are announced, each ministry develops a detailed budget within the ceiling in preparation for negotiations with the Ministry of Finance officials which take place usually in late summer and fall. During these negotiations, the Ministry of Finance can question the assumptions of the ministry budgets; and through such negotiations budgets can be reduced but not raised. Once intergovernmental negotiations are concluded, the budget is finalized by the Cabinet usually in late December. Final Diet approval occurs in the early part of the new year.

From this explanation we received, it seemed at the time likely that the growth of defense spending in Japan would be less than 7.5 percent, the ceiling set by the time of our visit. Obviously, in light of the decision by the Cabinet at the end of December to increase defense spending by 7.75 percent, political pressure can be brought to bear to overcome the inertia of the Japanese bureaucracy (a 7.75-percent increase would, after allowing for inflation, amount to a 4.6-percent increase in real terms).

Pressure from Korea, initiated in July, for Japan to contribute more economic assistance to Korea on the basis that Korean defense efforts enhance Japan's security further upset Japanese officials. Some suspicion existed that the United States and Korea could collaborate to intensify the pressure on Japan to do more in defense, and Japanese officials felt that such double-team approach would backfire.

The U.S.-Japan joint exercises are now undertaken regularly, indicating that a solid basis exists for further cooperation. However, the division of labor and joint planning between the United States and Japan are still at a relative primitive stage (primitive, for example, compared with the relatively more sophisticated level of planning between United States and Korean forces).

In this regard, opportunities are still available for Japan to do more to support U.S. forces in Japan. Japan has steadily increased its cost-sharing outlays in recent years in support of these forces. These expenditures for the upkeep of U.S. forces – facilities improvements, land rentals, etc. – now total about $1 billion annually. We were told, nevertheless, of areas where Japan could make additional expenditures to offset U.S. costs. For example, the U.S. Air Force in Okinawa feels that Japan should double or triple the level of support there (other U.S. services on Okinawa were satisfied with the degrees of Japanese support).

The Korean Peninsula



(From a report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives on May 25 this year)

Military Equation

	South	North
Mil. Budget	$3.2 bn	$1.1 bn
Troops	642,000	512,000
Mil. Aid from abroad	$1.1 bn	nothing
Foreign Troops	39,000 U.S. troops	none
Combined Forces Command	U.S.-South Korea Joint Command	none
Operational Control	U.S. General	Korean Commander
War Games	countless	none
Nuclear Arms	between 700–1,000	none

Pyongyang Urges Tokyo to Promptly Correct Textbooks

"The Japanese authorities in a recent 'government's view' of the problem of textbooks admitted their error in distorting history in textbooks. But they failed to take any measure and even declared that they would correct the textbooks in 1985. This, in essence, shows that they are unwilling to correct them," says Rodong Simmun (organ of the CC of the Workers' Party of Korea) in its commentary dated September 2.

The commentary entitled "They Must Promptly Correct Textbooks" noted:

The Japanese government's attitude is a mockery of and insult to the Asian peoples and the Japanese people demanding the correction of the distorted history textbooks.

If the Japanese government authorities were earnest in "repenting" for the war of aggression in the past days and expressing their will to correct their error, why should they delay the correction of the textbooks till 1985, not doing it now?

It is not a sincere attitude to try to evade responsibility, dragging on the time with empty talk in correcting error.

The Japanese reactionaries' persistent scheme to use the distorted textbooks is underlaid with their insidious attempt to hasten the militarization of the country and war preparations.

Now the Japanese reactionary ruling quarters advocate militarist aggression as an important state policy and, for this, show extra zeal in preparing the people ideologically. Stepping up large-scale arms buildup and conversion of Japan into a "military power" with a vast military spending, and hastening the militarization of economy and the shaping of politics on a reactionary pattern, the Japanese reactionaries are making haste with a series of measures for backing war preparations in the ideological, educational and cultural fields, too.

To teach a distorted history by revising textbooks is chiefly aimed at instilling the militarist idea of aggression into the minds of the youth and children and drawing them into a new war of aggression without difficulty.

Hence the reactionary ruling circles of Japan intend to delay the correction of the textbooks till 1985, though they showed their intention to correct the distorted textbooks, yielding to the ever growing pressure of public opinion at home and abroad.

This, in essence, shows that they are unwilling to correct the textbooks.

Japan should go along the road of peace, friendship and independence.

If Japan truly wants peace, she should boldly admit her mistake and promptly correct the textbooks and show her sincerity with deed.

Criticism of Combined War Game

The "U.S-Korea Combined Forces Command" started an annual commanding post training codenamed "Ulji-Focusland '82" from August 21. In addition, the south Korean forces, of late, have staged war games, including "Surprise Mobilisation Training of the Homeland Defense Reserve Forces", in and around south Korea.

Commenting on frequent military maneuvers conducted by the Americans and the south Koreans, Rodong Simmun (organ of the CC of the Workers' Party of Korea) on August 26 carried a signed commentary. It says:

A spokesman of the "combined forces command" announced that the purpose of the exercise is "to test and improve" the coordinated operation, planning and system of the U.S. troops occupying south Korea and the puppet army to cope with an "unexpected situation", and the south Korean puppets blared that through the "Surprise Mobilisation Training of the Homeland Defense Reserve Forces" and "Ulji" exercise" they would wholly examine the "wartime mobilisation system" and the "nation's posture of all-out war."

These facts tell that the current military exercise is aimed at further perfecting the coordinated operation command system of the U.S. troops and the puppet army and increasing their war potentials.

This furnishes patent proof that the new war provocation manoeuvres are becoming ever more dangerous in south Korea according to the U.S. imperialists' Korean strategy.

Facts show that the U.S. imperialists' profession of desire for peace in the Korean Peninsula and the jargon of the traitor Chon Du Hwan about "peaceful unification" are empty talk and those who are responsible for the aggravation of the situation are none other than the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppets.

The danger of war in Korea comes from the south.

In holding war exercises repeatedly and heightening tension the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppets try to create a terror-ridden atmosphere, divert elsewhere the attention of the south Korean people and thus tone down the mounting anti-U.S., anti-Chon Du Hwan sentiments at home and abroad.

The U.S. imperialists must discard their anachronistic policy of south Korean occupation and war maneuvers, pull out of south Korea at once and stop encouraging the puppets to fascism, split and war.

S. Korean Cartoon



THE DONG-A ILBO, AUGUST 15, '82

Korea Focus:

Growing Anti-Americanism in S. Korea

Referring to growing anti-American sentiments among the south Korean people, the recent "Letters from S. Korea" (carried in the August issue of the Japanese monthly magazine "Sekai," The World) said as follows:

"In the past, we, fully aware of our incompetency, thought that the Americans had checked the military in their endeavours to establish a dreadful 'democracy' on this country. However, now, we realize that those spoiled brats (the U.S.), ignoring the intense desire of our nation, can wield violence against us because of U.S. presence."

This statement clearly indicates that south Koreans' feelings towards the U.S. have changed greatly through the bitter lessons they have learned. In other words, they are well aware who is the real ruler of south Korea and who has mastermined all the misfortunes of the Korean people.

When the grass roots realize who a true oppressor is, they start internecine struggles in an efforts to overthrow him. This is common in history.

The "arson" incident at the American Cultural Center in Pusan was clear evidence to growing anti-Americanism among the south Korean people.

In his letter sent to Roman Catholic Cardinal Kim Su Hwan theology student Mun Bu Sik who was charged with setting fire to the ACC in Pusan, stated: "The act of expressing our will by the last extreme method of setting fire to the American Cultural Center was intended as a punishment of the historical crimes perpetrated by the United States in this country."

Restoration of Independence: Prerequisite

A noteworthy development in the south Korean people's recent struggles is the fact that they have developed their anti-fascist, democratic struggle into an anti-U.S. one for independence.

Since the Kwangju Massacre in May, 1980, anti-U.S. sentiments have been intensified among the south Korean people and anti-U.S. slogans are being heard everywhere in the world. In addition, of late, direct anti-U.S. actions have been launched in all parts of the world.

Moreover, anti-American feelings are running high among the Christian community, which was a hotbed of anti-communist ideas in the past.

These developments clearly illustrate the fact that the south Korean people at large have come to realize that unless they overthrow the colonial rule of the Americans and restore national independence, their society can not be democratized, nor can national reintegration be achieved.

The pre-liberation history of south Korea definitely shows that in a colonial status no transfer of power is possible.

Neither the overthrow of the Syngman Rhee regime by the April 19 Popular Uprising nor the fall of the "*yusin* system" following the assassination of Pak Jung Hi produce any real change for the south Korean people. After each transfer of power, fascistic suppression of the people was further intensified.

The south Korean people are now courageously staging anti-U.S. struggles for independence to put an end to the colonial rule of the Americans and to restore national independence.

Trend of Times

The anti-U.S. independent struggle of the south Korean people is not isolated, but closely linked up with people's struggles for independence, worldwide.

At present, the anti-U.S. forces for independence are growing scope and strength on the international arena, whereas the imperialist forces of reaction are weakening. The U.S., which domineered over the capitalist world as its leader in the past is in a difficult situation now. It has been isolated from and rejected by the people everywhere in the world and has lost most of its former monopoly and leadership even in the Western capitalist world.

Of late, even West European countries, the closest allies of the U.S., are acting independently in opposition to the policy of strength of the Reagan administration.

In Japan, the Japanese people are raising their voices for independence, instead of following the U.S. lead.

An anti-U.S. independent wave is sweeping not only specific areas but also all parts of the world. This is the inevitable trends of the times no force can hold in check.

The U.S. should fully understand the currents of the world, stop its illegal policy of infringing upon the sovereign rights and independence of other nations. In particular, it should terminate its colonial policy towards south Korea and withdraw all GIs and nuclear weapons from there. This is the only way of correctly resolving the Korean question.

The anti-U.S. struggle of the south Korean people for independence will develop further and international support for their struggle will be strengthened.

The March 18 "arson" incident at the American Cultural Center in Pusan

S. Korean Monthly "Wolgan Choson"

Roots of Injustice of S. Korean Society

Injustice thriving in south Korean society originates in the fact that pro-Japanese elements who in Japan's past colonial days have gained ground in political and various other circles. Among the pro-Japanese elements are successive leaders and high-ranking officials from the Syngman Rhee "regime" up to the presnet junta.

Introduced here are excerpts from an article by Kim Dae Sang, a director of Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation of Pusan, south Korea, on pro-Japanese elements in south Korean society. He insists in this article that Korean history should be reexamined.

The article was contributed to a south Korean monthly, "Wolgan Choson" (Monthly Korea), which was carried in its February issue of this year.

Right after Liberation

It is proposed that a society based on justice should be realized as the aim of our era. Even if people enjoy a high income level and live in plenty, their living is not easy without social justice.

Even if people can eat and support themselves well in a society, such society will not be a society worthy of living in, unless justice is not distinguished from injustice.

A just society is not a special society. In a just society one would not see the following happens.

A salaried employee, who has worked conscientiously for 10 years, can't have his own house, while astute fellows can easily be rich and live in luxury. A suspect of murder discloses in court that he was tortured by a detective and that the detective robbed the victim of murder of his articles in his possession.

Why have we so far failed to build a just society and why do we still propose to build a just society as the aim of our era?

The main reason is that we failed to establish the spirit of our nation at a historical turning point when Korea was liberated from Japan's colonial rule.

U.S. Military Government

The Aug. 15 liberation meant freedom from harsh suppression and exploitation under Japanese colonial rule and the start of a new history for our nation.

Therefore, it was urgently needed then to eradicate all the remnants of colonial rule in every aspect of our society as early as possible. The main point was how to punish pro-Japanese, anti-national acts in the colonial days and how to establish a national spirit.

By pro-Japanese traitorous acts, we don't mean the following:

What positions did pro-Japanese elements hold in order to live? They were driven by sheer necessity to cooperate passively with the Japanese rulers, but they should not be suppressed.

By pro-Japanese anti-national acts, we mean the acts of those, who actively cooperated with the Japanese rulers on their own accord for their own advancement and who took the lead in arresting and torturing patriots, drafting Koreans for forced labor or military servitude and in denying national culture.

When a new era opened after the end of oppression, it was impossible to establish a new sense of national values and our philosophy for a new era, if we failed to accuse the pro-Japanese elements of their traitorous acts.

However, this important task imposed on us after the liberation was not fulfilled. The U.S. military government attempted to pursue its occupation policy by keeping intact the old system of Japanese government-general and avoided solving the above-mentioned task by stressing the need to "respect the existing order." In addition, traitorous elements machinated to oppose this important task by utilizing their foundations established during the colonial days.

The legislative assembly established under the U.S. military government, passed a special bill on the punishment of pro-Japanese anti-national elements.

But the U.S. military government didn't intend to implement this law.

The problem of punishing traitorous acts was shelved for three years, and was proposed again as one of the subjects at the constituent assembly. Finally in September 1948, the "law for the punishment of traitorous acts" was formulated.

Syngman Rhee, who was backed by the anti-national forces, took a negative attitude to this law on the pretext that this law might invite a national split. In the meantime, the pro-Japanese elements attempted to prevent the enforcement of this law, so that a special committee to investigate traitorous acts faced difficulties.

The "president" ordered release of the leading members of the police, who had served in the colonial police where torture was a matter of daily occurrence and who had been arrested by the special committee. When an attempt to assassinate members of the special committee was disclosed, the committee virtually discontinued its activities.

On June 6, 1949, a police squad under the direction of a certain Chang, the then vice-minister of home affairs, attacked the office of the special committee, where 35 members of the committee were arrested. In the situation, the activities of the special committee ended in smoke, as the law was amended so that indictment of pro-Japanese elements should be terminated by the end of August, 1949.

During the period, pro-Japanese were indicated in some 120 cases by the special committee. However, those involved in only 12 of these cases were actually sentenced to prison terms of more than one year. Almost all of them were given suspended sentences or released because of illness.

Influential Pro-Japanese Remnants

Because of the failure to enforce the "law for the punishment of anti-national acts," pro-Japanese elements didn't hesitate to assume leading "government" posts or other public offices. Those people who committed anti-national traitorous acts were praised for their past careers and held important posts in various circles, including public offices.

For instance, a certain Li, who served, as a head of a police station during the colonial days became a minister of home affairs after becoming a leading official of the south Korean police. Another Li who had been active in independence movement, but later betrayed his comrades, by playing a role in arresting a large number of activists of the independence movement in Manchuria, became a president of a newspaper company and later a national assemblyman. A certain Ro, who was notorious for his career as a police man during the colonial days became a high-ranking official of the military police. These are only part of many examples, too numerous to enumerate.

Though Japanese colonial rule in Korea ended and a new era arrived, people can't but feel the absence of a national spirit. In addition, vulgar culture was introduced into our country by the GIs. A wrong sense of values and a wrong sense of ethics are deeply rooted in our society, where it is considered best to pursue one's advancement by any means in order to achieve one's selfish end and where justice is thrown overboard. This mistaken sense of values and the mistaken sense of ethics were the cause of the long-term presidency of Syngman Rhee, the May 16 coup, etc.

We have to strive to build a society based on justice, a society in which we can say that justice is respected and no injustice can thrive.



Korean Paintings "Autumn of Mt. Kumgang" By Kim Kyu Dong

(Continued from page 3)

Fortunately, my life was saved. I could survive, although I don't know whether the Japanese were tired of killing Koreans or I was just lucky.

On the way to the Terajima Police Station, the Japanese were running amuck to kill Koreans, adults, babies and women alike, as if they were a pack of bloodthirsty wolves, shouting "Koreans are running over there! Arrest them!," "They are breaking through this way! Arrest them" and "Kill them."

That was hell on earth

Taken to the Terajima Police Station, I was dragged to a "tokko" (special high police) room on the second floor.

At the police station, there were about 350 Koreans taken from various parts of the city.

Prepared to die in the "tokko" room, I said, "Why do you kill Koreans? Tell me the reason for it."

A "tokko" policeman who was surprised at these words of mine took me to the back yard of the police station, giving me kicks.

The yard was graveled. I had to lie down with bound hands and feet, together with other Koreans. It felt as if my blood were being drained from my whole body and were running out from my feet.

On the graveled yard, there were Koreans whose heads, hair chopped, hung on shoulders on one side. And yet they were struggling in agony.

The wounded Koreans were breathing their last, saying "Mother!" and "Give me water!"

Eight Koreans died.

It was at night the next day. A big earthquake occurred again.

The Japanese policemen began to escape.

Koreans also began to escape, prepared for death.

I followed other Koreans, too.

I climbed up a wall. There was an apple garden, and there I saw policemen killing fleeing Koreans.

I instinctively climbed up a cedar tree and hid myself.

Though policemen came there and went many times, they could not find me.

As the night was advanced I came down the tree and stole in the direction of the front-gate. At that moment, I heard someone cry "Help! Help!" from the direction of the front-gate.

Three Japanese military policemen drew out their knives and pounced upon 6 Koreans. Their heads and arms were gone.

I again began to creep. It was a detention cell that I reached. There were two Koreans. We couldn't weep, seized with fear.

Later they and I were detained at the police station for about 15 days, on the ground that we didn't escape. Later, we were transferred to the Narashino camps in Chiba Prefecture, where Russian soldiers captured during the Russo-Japanese War had been detained and where about 3,500 Koreans and about 500 Chinese were imprisoned.

After I was interned there for 40 days, I was taken to the temporary branch office of the Government-General in Aoyama and so I narrowly escaped death.

But I had lost my elder brother and my cousin by death in this hateful massacre of Koreans.

Historical Relics of DPRK (11)

Anak Tomb No. 3

(Continued from the previous issue)

In the past 10 years, some 70 Koguryo mounds were discovered. Out of them, Anak tomb No. 3 and the Tokhungri mound are particularly important. Both these tombs have letters showing their dates of erection on their murals, so that they serve as a criterion for determining the construction dates of the mural mounds.

Anak tomb No. 3 in Anak County, South Hwanghae Province, consists of big chambers (ante-chamber, back-chamber, two side chambers), a long gallery and a stone gate. These chambers are separated from each other by square or octagonal pillars. Depicted on the frescos of the left chamber belonging to the front room are the seated figures of a king and a queen and in the right chamber a kitchen, a carriage, and a parade in the gallery. On the other murals are drawings of guards, musical performance, dance, etc. On both the right and left walls of the entrance to the western-side chamber, standing figures were drawn. There are Indian-ink letters denoting the date of erection. According to these letters, the person drawn on the left wall is Tong Su from the Liaotung Peninsula, who died in 357. Tong Su is supposed to be identical with Tung Shou of Yen (Yen is one of the feudal states which existed in a period known in Chinese history as the period of 16 kingdoms. The Yen state was founded by the Hsien-pei tribe in the northwest of Korea in 316). Tung Shou sought asylum in Koguryo in 336.

From these Indian-ink letters, not a few people assert that Anak tomb No. 3 is the tomb of Tong Su.

However, there is no doubt that Anak tomb No. 3 is the tomb of a Koguryo king. This was proved by the fact that Anak tomb No. 3 is the largest in scale of all the Koguryo tombs and also from the parade and officers of troops drawn on the walls. From the place where Indian-ink letters are written, it is supposed that they are not about the king but about the persons depicted on the right and left walls of the entrance to the western-side chamber. This can be presumed from the Tokhungri mural mound (Tokhungri, Taean, Nampo City, DPRK). The epitaph on the Tokhungri mound telling of the deeds of the deceased, is inscribed in the center of the northern wall of the coffin chamber.

Anak tomb No. 3 is the tomb built in the earliest period of the Koguryo dynasty, a representative mural mound of the period.

There are two views on the person buried in Anak tomb No. 3. One is that Anak tomb No. 3 is the tomb of King Michon (300–331) and the other is that it is the tomb of King Kogukwon (331–371).

It was King Kogukwon to whom Tong Su served until he died after his exile in Koguryo. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that Anak tomb No. 3 is the tomb of King Kogukwon. King Kogukwon died in a battle against Paekche in Pyongyang in 371. Anak tomb No. 3 is identical in characteristics with the tombs built in the period.

The posthumous titles of the successive kings of Koguryo before the 5th century, when the capital of Koguryo was transferred to Pyongyang, were given in association with the place names where they were buried. Thus, King Kogukwon was buried at Kogukwon, It was not certain where Kogukwon was located. Some argue that Kogukwon was located at Tsian (China) and it is strange that the tomb of King Kogukwon should be in Hwanghae Province (DPRK). Then came a denial of the view, and then it was argued that Anak tomb No. 3 was the tomb of King Kogukwon.

The view that Anak tomb No. 3 is the tomb of King Michon, father of King Kogukwon, is as follows:

King Michon died in 331 and was buried in Hwanto Castle (which the Chinese called Tungkon). The tomb of King Michon was violated by the Earlier Yen troops which captured Hwanto Castle in 342. At the time, the remains of King Michon was looted. Through diplomatic negotiations, Koguryo managed to take back the King Michon's remains the next year. According to this view, Aank tomb No. 3 was erected for the remains of King Michon.

There is a problem in this view, King Michon had no direct relations with Tong Su, who is depicted as an attendant on the walls of Anak tomb No. 3.

This view originates in the idea that Kogukwon was located in Tsian. In the past, the capital of Koguryo was presumed to have been Kuknaesong Castle in Tsian, until the capital was moved to Pyongyang. However, according to *Samguk-sagi*, History of Three Kingdoms, during the period, the capital was moved among Kuknaesong Castle, Hwantosong Castle and Pyongyang Castle depending on circumstances.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that King Kogukwon moved his residence to Pyongyang in 343 after the Earlier Yen troops attacked Hwantosong Castle. How long he was in Pyongyang is not clear.

Samguk-sagi, only records that the capital was in Kuknaesong Castle, as proved by the existence of the tombstone of King Kwanggaeto.

It is presumed that King Kogukwon was in Pyongyang Castle until his death. This is clear from the fact that the Koguryo troops led by King Kogukwon clashed with Paekche troops in Pyongyang in 371 and King Kogukwon died in the battle. From this it is also supposed that the capital of Koguryo at the time was Pyongyang. In those days, Koguryo tried to expand its territory westward. In the south, Koguryo faced Paekche and was attacked by it. As King Kogukwon died in Pyongyang, he is believed to have been buried in or around Pyongyang. From this, Anak tomb No. 3 is supposed to be the tomb of King Kogukwon.

King Kogukwon is believed to have re-erected the tomb of King Michon, which is supposed to have been erected near Hwanto Castle. Pangtaitzu tomb No. 1 in Liao-yang (China) is worthy. of special note. The arrangement of the tomb and the murals of this tomb are close to those of Anak tomb No. 3. Pangtaitzu tomb No. 1 is larger in scale than Anak tomb No. 3. The tomb is supposed to be the tomb of King Michon which was re-erected after 343 or the tomb of King Sosurim who died in 384. It is reasonable to think that Pangtaitzu tomb No. 1 is the tomb of King Michon.

According to *Samguk-sagi*, Koguryo's capital from 247 to 342 was Pyongyang. During the period or in 296, the tomb of King Sochon (270–292) located at Kogukwon was dug open. From this, Kogukwon is believed to have been located around Pyongyang.

It is presumed from these available materials that Kogukwon was located near Pyongyang.

(To be continued)

A king painted on a wall of Anak tomb No. 3

Relics of Kaesong, Ancient Capital

Kwandok Pavilion

Janam-dong is a district in Kaesong City where medieval-style houses are found. These houses are all low-roofed, with small doors and windows. In this district stands Janam Hill. The hill, the top of which commands a bird's-eye view of the city, is well known as a scenic spot of Kaesong. From Janam Hill, we can see not only the whole city but also Mt. Samgak, the highest mountain in Seoul. It is only 40km from Janam Hill to Mt. Samgak.

The Kwandok Pavilion is on this hill. It measures 5.84 metres in length and 3.18 metres in breadth.

Once in the Koryo period, there stood a straw-thatched pavilion. Later in 1780, during the Li Dynasty, it was rebuilt and enlarged by "hanryang" people.

According to "Taekriji,"** a book written by Li Jung Hwan*, a practical scientist of the 18th century, under the Li Dynasty, the population was divided into three classes: "ryangban," "chungin" and "hain."

The "ryangban" meant two classes of nobility, civilian and military nobles, called "munban" and "muban." Townsmen and peasants belonged to the "hain" class. The "chungin" class included doctors and intellectuals.

Only people of the "ryangban" class could join government service. In order to be an official, aristocrats had to pass an examination on 10 subjects, called "Kwago." Those who failed in the examination virtually belonged to the "chungin" class, though they were aristocrats. Those family members of officials, who had no position in the government, were also ranked as "chungin."

Of the postless aristocrats, those who belonged to "munban," were called "yuhak" and others who were "muban" were called "hanryang."

For training in martial arts and also because of a lot of free time they had, the "hanryang" exercized in archery in the mountains. The Kwandok pavilion was situated in one of the training grounds for "hanryang" people.

Today this pavilion is the most popular observation platform in the Janam National Park.

* Li Jung Hwan ... (1690–?)

A geographer and a practical scientist.

He inherited the theories of *silsahui* (searching for truth on the basis of the reality), expounded by Li Ik, an authority of practical sciences in Korea.

Li Jung Hwan travelled in all parts of the country for 30 years and studied the geography and socio-economic system of Korea.

** "Taekriji". An excellent book on Korean geography in the 18th century, written by Li Jung Hwan in 1714. It contained comments on the characteristic features of various parts of Korea, topography, natural features, local customs, communication, etc.

NEWS DISPATCH FROM PYONGYANG

Aug. 27

* A delegation of the Industrial Research Centre of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya headed by its General Director Muhamed Abu-Rakhes arrived in Pyongyang.
* A government mining delegation of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma arrived in Pyongyang.
* A Japanese delegation of the Hyogo Prefectural Solidarity Organisation Supporting the Independent and Peaceful Reunification of Korea headed by Umabe Kishio, representative member of the Hyogo Prefectural People's Council for Supporting the Independent and Peaceful Reunification of Korea arrived in Pyongyang.
* A Yamagata prefectural delegation for Japan-Korea friendship and solidarity headed by Endo Noboru, Director of the Yamagata Prefectural Assembly-men's League for Promotion of Japan-Korea Friendship and Chairman of the Yamagata Prefectural Farmers Association arrived in Pyongyang.

Aug. 28

* A delegation of Rodong Sinmun (the organ of the CC of the WPK) left Pyongyang for a visit to Hungary.

Aug. 30

* A scientific-technological cooperation delegation of the Soviet Union headed by M.G. Kruglov, vice-Chairman of the Soviet State Committee of Science and Technology, arrived in Pyongyang to attend the 15th Meeting of the Permanent Sub-Committee for Scientific-Technological Cooperation of the Inter-Governmental Economic and Scientific-Technological Consultative Committee of the DPRK and the Soviet Union.
* A delegation of the Society for the Promotion of Relations between Austria and the DPRK headed by Elmecker Robert, Member of the Austrian Parliament, arrived in Pyongyang.
* Fred Agbobli, Chief of the Literati and Artists Branch of the Ghana National Institute of the Juche Idea, arrived in Pyongyang.
* A delegation of scholars of Lagos University, Nigeria, headed by Prof. and Dr. O.J. Fapohunda, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the university arrived in Pyongyang.
* The Polish "Zaglebie-Sosnowec" club basketball team arrived in Pyongyang. (KCNA)

S. Korean Economy Slows as Exports Slump: Asian Wall Street Journal

EDITOR'S NOTE: The Asian Wall Street Journal, in the August 31 issue, reported in detail on Seoul's fading economic growth and on a slump in the textile industry.

The following two articles were written by Anthony Spaeth. (Excerpts)

SEOUL – The South Korean economy rapidly is losing steam.

"Exports are low, people's income is low," says an executive of Samsung Co., one of Korea's largest general trading companies. "Basically, the economic situation in Korea isn't growing."

Some economists warn that the economy is heading for the same kind of turbulence that plunged the country into recession two years ago. Recent government moves to stimulate the economy, including sharp cuts in interest rates and a pumping up of the money supply, could bring back the rampant inflation of two years ago.

"I'm very concerned about the (government) measures," says a foreign banker based here. "I think we're in for the same kind of instability next year that we saw in the recent past."

Like the other export-led economies of East and Southeast Asia, South Korea is being hurt by a decline in demand from the recession-mired U.S. and Europe. But in Korea's case, the slump is ending the country's brief but successful rebound from the 1980 recession. It also may signal an end to the government's soberly effective economic management of the past few years, which cooled a dangerously overheated economy and introduced badly needed stability over a short period.

Unemployment Problem

The slowdown also could make unemployment a problem. The government says it needs "real," or inflation-adjusted, economic growth of about 7% to minimize unemployment. But the 1982 official growth projection for gross national product is 6%, and private estimates by economists range from 6% to below 5%. GNP, the nation's total output of goods and services, grew 7.1% in 1981.

To keep people employed, "5% to 6% growth isn't adequate for Korea," says V.L. Rajan, resident representative in Seoul for the International Monetary Fund.

The current downturn, coming on the heels of the 1980 recession, will further delay investments in many industries that have been postponed since 1979. Without adequate investment, Korea's export manufacturing industries could start to lose competitiveness. For two years, for example, the government has pressed textile makers to invest in new equipment for a badly needed modernization of the industry. Manufacturers, however, are just shrugging their shoulders.

"Who can buy machinery now?" asks Poong-Un Park, managing director of Textile Division I for Daewoo Corp., which will export about $540 million in textiles this year. "Who can afford it?"

Korean export growth is fading as the U.S. and European economies continue in a slump. Exports during the first seven months of 1982 totaled $12.2 billion, up 1.5% from a year earlier. Nonetheless, the government's year-end target for exports has fallen from an optimistic projection of $24 billion made at the beginning of the year to a current estimate of $22 billion to $22.5 billion. The current estimate would represent a maximum increase in exports of less than 6% from 1981.

Textiles Decline

Shipments of light-industrial goods, including textiles, the country's largest export item, declined 2.7% in value in the seven months, to $5.7 billion. With export volume about the same as a year earlier, the decline in the value of the exports gives another indication of the weakness of Korea's overseas markets.

Textile prices are 10% lower than last year, according to Mr. Park of Daewoo.

The next few months probably will be worse for exports, Letter-of- credit arrivals, representing payments for orders that will be shipped in the next three to six months, fell 8.5% in the first seven months. About 90% of Korea's exports are paid for by letters of credit.

"The reduction in exports is broadbased," says the IMF's Mr. Rajan. "Everything is going down." The only exceptions this year have been machinery exports and exports of ships. But even the order books at Korea's dockyards are starting to empty out. Economists say domestic demand is unlikely to pick up the slack in the economy caused by the sagging exports.

Household Income

"Domestic demand was already weak and it continues to be weak," says Mr. Rajan. "It's reacting to three years of stagnant income. It's time for it to be cautious – it can't be helped."

Average household income rose a real 19% in 1978 and 16% in 1979 but started falling in the recession and post-recession years. Income fell a real 5.3% in 1980 and 3.4% last year. Monthly household income in the first quarter was about 3% higher than a year earlier. "By the end of last year we had just regained the levels of income recorded in 1979," says Chung Woo-Chull, and economist for the Korea Exchange Bank.

"It's not up enough to sustain a recovery," says a Seoul-based Western diplomat who follows economic affairs. "It's hard to believe consumers will be optimistic in the future," at least until there's some pickup in exports.

Adds Jung-Woong Park, secretary-general of the Federation of Korean Industries: "Our economy depends on factors other than the domestic ones. There are so many variables which are out of our control. And the global economy is still unpredictable. But the pessimistic viewpoint is predominating."

Officially, the economy is estimated to grow at a real rate of 6%, down from the government's original estimate of 8%. Further weakening of exports could bring that estimate down. "Around 6%," says In-Yong Chung, vice minister of the government's Economic Planning Board, "includes five-point-something. If we can have a good harvest, we'll be at least near 6%"."

Much of the 5% to 6% growth this year has come from stimulative government spending during the first half, particularly on construction projects. Korea Electric Power Corp., a government corporation, is building eight nuclear power plants.

"Kepco alone is keeping the GNP going," says Mr. Rajan. "One or two percentage points of growth came from it alone."

The government also is building roads and funding housing construction. Altogether, these government projects contributed the bulk of a 10% increase in domestic capital formation recorded by the Bank of Korea at the end of June.

Government spending in the second half is less certain. The government's revenue began dropping after it introduced substantial tax cuts over the summer. Value-added taxes and customs tarrifs are also declining. The government says it will cut its budget, but admits its deficit will be larger than originally expected. "We can afford some stimulation measures," says Mr. Chung, the vice minister.

The government's other moves to prime the economy are causing consternation among economic observers. In June, it cut interest rates to 10% from 13.5% to 14%. Corporate taxes were slashed to 20% from a 33% to 38% range. And the government said it would lift its self-imposed ceiling on money-supply growth. Since the recession, growth in the money supply has been held below 22% a year. This has helped bring inflation this year to below 10% on an annual basis.

The government said its economic moves were aimed at getting funds to companies that found themselves without credit following this spring's financial scandal on the local private loan, or curb market. But outsiders worry that the measures were political, aimed to divert public attention from the scandal, which involved relatives of the wife of Korean President Chun Doo Hwan.

Outsiders say the stimulation can do nothing for the export sector. "The risk of this policy is that it's geared to stimulating domestic demand," says Mr. Rajan. "But domestic consumption may be impossible to rouse after so many years of stagnant incomes.

"There is the danger of excess liquidity," Mr. Rajan says. In July, the money supply jumped almost 33% from a year earlier. "Then inflation may cut into export growth," he postulates.

"It's too early to sound alarm bells," says one Western diplomat. But if inflation starts climbing, "they are going to have to do something."

Some economists say local businessmen will use the newly available funds to retire some of their debt, improving this year's balance sheets. But new investments are unlikely until the export picture is rosier, they say.

"Ask the business community," says one Western banker. "There's virtually no demand for loans for new investments."

Foreign investment in Korea is down this year, because of poor economic conditions and some highly publicized disputes of late between foreign investors and their Korean partners. For the first seven months of the year, $103 million in foreign investments was approved by the government, up 16% from a year earlier. But only $54 million in investments had actually arrived in the country, a 28% drop from 1981.

Textile Industry Is Facing Bad Year

SEOUL – South Korea's textile industry is experiencing one of the worst years in its history.

Business is so poor that Korean textile exporters nearly have abandoned their efforts to cultivate new markets in the Middle East, Africa and South America. And a poor performance this year is jeopardizing the government's plan to modernize the industry by 1986.

"We are faced with major difficulties," says Noh Chin-Shik, secretary-general of the Korea Federation of Textile Industry.

Largest Export Item

Textiles are Korea's largest export item; they have accounted for almost 30% of total exports this year. In the first seven months, textile shipments totaled $3.4 billion, down about 1% from a year earlier. Prices of the goods have fallen up to 10%, manufacturers say, a reflection of the weak demand abroad. The government says for all of 1982 textile exports should be flat or slightly lower than 1981.

"This is the first year we will see minus growth," Mr. Noh says. From 1967 to 1977 the industry registered annual growth rates of 35%. Since then growth in exports has slowed, to 31% in 1978, 13% in 1979 and 11% in 1980. Last year, exports rose 23% to $6.3 billion, mainly, Mr. Noh says, due to "unusual demand" from Libya, China, Iran and Iraq. "This demand has died this year," Mr. Noh says.

"Everything within Korea made it a very good year," says Poong-Un Park, managing director of Textile Division I for Daewoo Corp. "Wages are pretty flat, interest rates are down and material costs, especially in textiles, are down.

"But the international market is so bad," Mr. Park says.

For several years, Korean manufacturers have tried to diversify their export markets, concentrating less on the traditional markets of

(Continued from page 1)

On Canadian Tour

His Canadian trip was arranged in accordance with the script written by the U.S. for veiling their "two Koreas" policy and policy of aggression.

Through Chon Du Hwan's Canadian junket the U.S. sought a heinous aim of improving the image of the traitor isolated from and rejected by the south Korean people and overseas compatriots and, furthermore, tying up such satellite state as Canada with the puppets.

During the visit to Canada, Chon brought forward "Pacific summit talks" But it is not his invention. It had been conceived by the U.S. to keep the Pacific nations well within the sphere of its domination and is a product of its strategy for Asian aggression.

Chon Du Hwan is a colonial stooge who is not entitled to talk about "summit talks" and so forth. He plays the dirty role of a shock brigade in executing the U.S. policy of aggression in accordance with the script written by the United States, his master.

The U.S. hopes to deliver the puppets from international isolation by disguising south Korea as an "independent state" and installing it among the Asian countries.

The ugly color of Chon Du Hwan was uncovered also when he came out with his deceptive "unification proposal" and solicited "support" to it.

The so-called "unification proposals" of the south Koreans are all aimed at freezing the division under the veil of unification and they were put in the hands of the puppets by the U.S. to keep south Korea under its military occupation and continue to pursue its colonial enslavement policy.

It is brazen and shameless of them to twaddle about "national concord" and "democracy and unification" without a word as to the fundamental and principled requisite to the solution of the question of national reunification.

(Sep. 2)

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